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Structural Strength
The accidents attributed by the statistics to the cells
and their accessories represent but a small fraction (6-’7~)of
the total. Their num-~er should be reduced, however, to ~.lmost
complete disappearance. In fact, the elements which share in
the fatigue of the various parts of an air;jlaneare relatively
well known and there is no insurmountable difficulty in dimen-
sioning the framework and accessories accordingly.
It is, of course, the “stunt” airplanes which pay the heav-
iest tribute to structural. iiefects. It must not be “forgotten,
however, that, although ordinary airplanes are not expected to
indulge voluntarily in acrobatic stunts, they may sometimes be
forced to do so. Such is the case, for example, when an air-
plane dives suddenly in order to avoid stalling.
.I.no~der to solve, as a whole, the problem of the minimum
,,
strength to be given the s“tructural:elements of airplanes, it
*l’Ex&nen d!Ensemble des Principaux Probl&mes ~oncernfit’’la’S&-
curitd de la lTavigatio-nAdrienne, II.llBulletinTechnique~l of the
“Service Tec-hniqueet Industrial de llA6ronautique,’1 June 18,
1927.
**For’part 1, see N.A.C.A. Technic&1 Memorandum No. 464.
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is necessary:
2
1. To know, as exactly,as possible, the stresses to which
.... ..
.
these elements would be subje&ed under the most unfavorable
circumstances;
2. To know, as exactly as possible,. the mechanical proper-
ties of the materials which receive these stresses;
e
3. To be sure that the fatigue or wear, resulting from
long use, will not dangerously affect the magnitude of the
stresses and the original strength of the new material.
The stresses, supported by the constituent .elernentsof the
airplaine, vary greatly, not only from one type of construction
to another, but even for one and the same airplane, according
to the circumstances of flight and especially according to the
accelerations produced by the more or less rapid evolutions.
Nevertheless, all agree the three following cases are the most
important ones to stud~ (’va~iousReports, XVIII and XIX):
10 Flight at the extreme forward position of the center,.
of pressure;
2. Flight at the maximum speed;
3. Vertical dive.
The first case corresponds to the maximum ‘fatigue of the front
......wingsPar; the second and third, to the fatigue of the rear
,., ,.
spar and to the maximum stress of drag. The two latter give,
in fact, interesting data on the fatigue of the front struts
and spars when subjected to aerodynamic” stresses directed downw-
ard.
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Tilethree principal cases must be supplemented by the study
of several secondary cases, such as: inverted flight for stunt
airplanes”> flexure of the wings in landing, for airplanes a part
of whose load is located in the cell; the dissymmetric result
due to the action of the ailerons.
The study of the aerodynamic characteristics of an airplane
gives accurately enough the magnitude of the direct stresses
for each of the three typical cases. These stresses must be in-
creased to inake allowance for the overloading caused by the at-
mospheric disturbances and the forces of inertia developed in
the evolutions. The values obtained are then multiplied by the
factor of safety adopted for the type of airplane undex consid-
eration, ,which factor is generally 2—2.5.
Lastly, the stresses, which the various elements of the
airplailemust withsta’hdbefore breaking, are found by multiply-
ing the direct stresses by an inclusive factor, which is the
load factoz’for the dase under consideration.. There has been
much discussion concerning what values the load factors should
have. If they are too high, the’structure is too heavy al~dthe
efficiency of the airplane is impaired. If too low, failures
are liable to occur during flight.
Finally, the determination of the load factors brings us
.—-
..,,.. ...
..,. .,.
back to the determination of the acceleration which the corre-
sponding airplanes must withstand under the diverse circum-
< stances of flight. These accelerations can be quite easily cle-
. ,- ,,..
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termined for a few typical airplanes, which has been done through
.—
several series of efiari”mentsundertaken in FXtice and in other
countries. It is not so important, however, to know the abso-
lute values of the accelerations, as to know their variations ac-
cording to the,dimensions of the airplane, the area of its con-
trol surfaces and the energy with which the latter are put in
operation. It is, in fact, necessary to determine with a fair
degree of accuracy the accelerations which a projected airplane
will have to support from the ineasurements of accelerations on
a somewhat similar airplane. These measurements could be prof-
itably supplemented by researches:
1. On the braking effect of the propellers, which plays .an
important part in determining the conditiorls Of diViIlg fli@ti:;
20 On the variations in the lift and drag for angles of
attack attaining or exceeding the angle of zero lift (These
Variat.ion.sa,reifilport~fitt~ consider for diving, stunt flying
and ir.vertedflight);
3. 0:13the distribution of the aerodynamic pressures along
the chord for most of the wing sections actually used.
Regarding this distribution, it may be questioned as to
“’””whether the wing sections, which undergo large,displacements of
the center of pressure between the angle of maximum lift and
the angle of zero lift, do not present serious disadvantages
for the structural, strength of the cell. These wing sections,
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in fact, almost exclusively load the front spar in flight at
large tigles, and the rear sp>.rin flight at small angles. In
the latter case, moreover, they sometimes develop downward
stresses on the spar, which greatly fatigue the struts and their
fittings. They render it necessary, therefore, to give each
spar more strength than would be required if the displacements
of the center of pressure were more ‘moderate.
In addition to the cell, the fuselage and the tail planes,
particular attention must be given the ailerons. Accidents to
the latter are relatively frequent. It seems probable that the
aerodynamic loads supported by the ailerons, when deflected down-
ward in flying at small angles of attack, are much greater than
is generally assumed and greater than the simple consideration
of the lateral balancing couple would lead o-neto suppose. On
the other hand, at high speeds, the ailerons sometimes develop
vibrations so intense as to dislocate the rear portion of the
wing And violently agitate the control stick. Mqny serious ac-
cidents have been caused by these vibrations and it would be
very important to determine”their true cause through methodical
researches. i.
There is no occasion to renew here the discussions concern-
ing the static breaking $ests.a.nd their gua~~ties of saf~ty,
as corflparedwith those of the strength ’calculations. So long
as technical progress does not furnish more solid bases for
structures as complex as those of airplanes, static tests will
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be the only
--.valuat.ion.
not be made
ered. They
fatigue, or
ones capable of furnishing indisputable eleinents of
Unfortunately, the,setests are very costly and can
for each of the p~incipal flight cases to be consid-
have to be limited. to the most unfavorable case of
to the one whose calculation will be the most haz–
ardous, The importance given to static tests soi’netimestempts
constructors to base their calculations on the breaking strength,
instead of on the elastic limit of the corresponding materials.
This is regrettable because for aeronautic structures, as well
as for all others, it is the passing beyond the limit of elas-
ticity which Marks the real beginning of
fore desirable that, while deriving from
data they must furnish, the constructors
their calculations, on the consideration
danger. It ii there-
the static tests the
s“houlddepend more., i-n
of the proportionality
limit of the deformations to the styesses.
It is not enough, however, for the tests and calculations
relative to the original model to be satisfactory, but it is
also necessary to be assured that the quantity-produced airplanes
will have the same guaranties as the model from which they are
derived. It is possible to have such guaranties only when the
quality of the materials used remains as good and when they are
fashioned with equal care.
., ,.
.
The general adoption of metal fo~ the fr~ework of airplanes
r
constitutes. real progress. It would be better, however, for
the methods, employed in different countries for verifying the
n, ,,.,-- ....-.. , ..(,. ,,, ,, .-.--,!-..-”,!,!,
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quality of the metallurgical products, to be more uniform and to
ena,ble-more accurate comparisons. The adopti_onof a standard
test piece in the different countries would be particularly de-
sirable (Reports to the C.I.N.A. , XX). Mereover, the researches
undertaken in the different countries for improving the proper-
ties of the light alloys and for rendering them more immune to
moist or salt air, should be continued.
L“Wtly, aeronautic structures are still too fragile and del-
icate to leave them free to develop without any safety control,
as regards their execution and their aging in service. Every
control or restriction disturbs and retards. The control i~ust
therefore be reduced to
no favor to aeronautics
would be disastrous for
quire both constructors
safety ineasures. There
and more destructive of
an airplane cell in flight, because it is
a very strict mini-mum, but it would be
,
to allow accidents to happen, as this ‘
the advertising. It is better to re-
aredusers to adopt a few indispensable
is nothing r,ore demoralizing for pilots
public confidence than the failure of
without recourse.
Defects in the Functioning of the Engines
Next to errors in piloting, these cause the most accidents,
zepr.es,enting,in fact, 20 to 25% of all the cases confirmed.
.,,
,.,
Nevertheless, accidents due to engine defects are, on the aver-
age, less serious than those due to othex causes. This is be-
cause an engine rarely fails instantaneously, so that the pilot
N.A.C.A. Technical Memorandum No”?465 ‘8
often has time to take ineasures for lessening the seriousness of
the results. ... .
A tabulation, covering 1570 cases of engin’efailure in French
military and maritime aviation,, shows about
involving the fuel system,
II II ignition,
!I II installation,
II II distribution,
1! II cooling system,
II 11 lubrication,
!1 1! carburetion,
II II other or indetermin-
ate causes.
The above cases did not all cause accidents. The relative
line
seriousness of their consequences varied considerably from one~
to another. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw the following
general conclusions. The accidents involving the installation
often originate in defective lubrication, which is more or less
easily detected. We are thus led to conclude that failures afi-
cribable t,odefective lubrication have a percentage almost as
high as those connected with the fuel system, or about 20%.
Aside from the two preceding defects (which together make about
40~)~’ failures of the carburetion and distributiorna,re the most
important, not only because of their still high rate (212 to-
gether), but also because of the fire hazards entailed. On the
other h~d, the defects of the fuel and cooling systems, of the
I
I
.— — .
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lubrication and, to some extent, of the carburetion, which all
together constitute nea~ly half the cases, are generally due
themselves to a poor design or to insufficient attention to the
pipes and their connections. Lastly, the importance of the good
functioning of the engine accessories (fuel pwaps, ma~netos,
spark plugs, radiators and carburetors) is demonstrated by the
high percentage of the failures which involve them more or less
directly (fuel system, igilition, cooling system, carburetion).
The frequency of these failures can be reduced “(Martinot-
Lagarde, XIV. - Brunat, II, III, 1“): by improving t<fiendur-
ance of the engines themselves; by a better installation of the
pipes aildaccessories; by facilitating the inspection and repairs
on board; and lastly, by dividing the power plant so that fail-
ures will reimainpartial instead of affecting all the available
power.
The endurance of the engines has
during the last ten years, but it can
increased. The prescribed acceptana
been undeniably increased
and must be still further
tests which are now 50
hours , should be gradually incneased to 100 hours, if not to
150 hours. Moreover, the tolerances which are still allowed
.
during these tests for injuries,or the replacement of secondary
pa~~s, should be”gradually reducedin number and quality. These
results can probably be attained by the gradual improvement of
the details, rather than by important innovations.
It is.not possible to enumerate here all the points wilich
..—
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should receive attention. The following, however, are speciallY
... .-’ . .
impor”ttit:
Very’ careful supervision of the quantity apd of the treat-
ment of the metals used. Both”the constructor and the user must
be sure that the engine parts, ,,which are subject to very severe
stresses, have the requisite characteristics*. Unifo~mitY of the
quality is almost preferable to its absolute value.
Improvement of the lubrication.- The use of oil radiators
and purifiers and, if necessarY, of two oil PumPs~ is especially
recomme-nded.
Heating the carburetor&,- It is import~t for the carbure-
tion not to be disturbed by the modifications of the atmosphere
and especially by sudden changes in temperature or humidity.
These d.isadvamtages can be avoided by suitably heating the in-
take air. It is best to resort as little as possible to the ex-
haust gases for this purpose, because of the fire hazard6 when
inadequate precautions are taken. It is better to do the heat-
ing with the water or oil circulation.
Thorough cooling of the valves, especially of the exhaust
——
.
valve and increasing the durability of the val+vq,springs.
.,,.,,,.,.!,,..,.’ .... .
,,. .,,,,’,. ,.,’,
Reference has already been made to the large number of en-
gine failures due to defects in the connection, pipes zmd ac-
cessories. It is necessary, at ,anycost, to improve their in-
-—
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stallation and functioning. This point cannot be too strongly
emphasized for-the safety of aviation. The-pipes and accesso-
ries are the intermediate parts between the cell and the engine,
so that they are often unfortunately neglected by the construc-
tors of both, each specialist leaving their installation to his
colleagues.
It is difficult to make the pipes perfectly tight and yet
sufficiently flexible to withstand the vibrations of the
The shorter the pipes and the fewer the connections, the
it is to obtain tightness. On the contrary, the need of
engine.
easier
with-
standing the vibrations leads to the consideration of sinuous
pipes interrupted from place to place by elastic connections.
In order to be sufficiently flexible, these connections consist
of rubber tubes, which age rapidly aildwhich are quickly im-
paired by the gasoline. Ile -particles from the disintegration
of these connections stop the pipes, filters and spraying noz-
zles and cause a large proportion of the failures in the ali-
mentation ~d carburetion. Many failures are also caused by
leaks due to defective joints.
There are two ways to avoid these disadvantages. The first
consists in very carefully designing the principal fuel pipes\
in advance instead of applying thein,hit or miss, after the en-
. . . .,,!’.., , .. .—
gine is completed. This method would often render it possible
to lessen the number of joints, while leaving” the pipes with
sufficient flexibility. The second way consists in making the
4
II I I II Ilmlml I I Ilmllnmmml Imll I II 111111111 II II I 1 1111111—--lml
,,
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necessary connections flexible without the use of rubber or, if
..
rubber is used, in protecting it from all direct contact with
the gasoline’. Various devices, utilizing accordion-plaited
tubes or metallic linings, ‘orgoldbeater’s skin, have been tried.
These should be tested on a larger scale (A contest is now.open
in France, tider the auspices of the “Comit6 de Propaganda,” for
the invention of flexible joints for gasoline pipes).
Among the engine accessories, whose functioning should be
improved, are the fuel pumps, magnetos and spark plugs- It
would be very useful to maice, as far as possible for each type”
of engine, standard models of these accessories and avoid chang-
ing them afterwards.
In order to save trouble and the need of carrying so large
stocks, the air services, both civil and military, try to make
the various accessories interchangea”~le between different engine
types. Without wishing to completely eliminate this procedure,
which rests on a legitimate economical conception, it ‘maYbe
said that the disadvantages entailed by its too general adoption
more than offset its possible advantages. In principle, the
accessories with which the engine should continue to be provided
are the ones with which it made its official endurance tests,
andrthese’accessories should be installed during-t,he tests, un-
der the same conditions as they are to be used in service.
Of course the power and the rotational speed for which the
N.A. C.A. Technical h[eaorandum No. 465 13
engine is tested in the factory; should never be exceeded in
.
service. This is so obvious that it would seem needless to pro-
claim it if experience had not demonstrated the infractions to
which it is exposed. Such infractions are particularly danger-
ous with supercharged engines. These engines are not designed
to function at full intake at sea level and can support full in-
take without abnormal fatigue only at the altitude correspond-
ing to the equivalent power, The pilot who exceeds, on the
ground, the authorized intake limit, in order to facilitate the
take-off or to accelerate the climb, runs the risk of a serious
accident. Automatic intake controls (Dorand, IX) and recording
instrufflentsmaking it possible to control constantly the R.P..N,
developed during flight, are capable of renderiilgvaluable serv-
ice by preventing the pilots from committing such errors.
The ineasures to be taken to improve the conditions of up-
keep and of speed Qf.tileengine-propeller groups, vary too much
on different airplane types for them to be determined in advance.
Two general methods can be recommended, however? The first con-
sists in mounting each group, complete with all its accessories,
on a removable engine bed. In order to make any important re-
pairs or replace the engine, the whole assembly is removed from
Wi% ‘hirpl”.tie.This operation requires only a few minutes and
renders it possible to make all the necessary changes renderthe
best conditions. Many constructors have adopted this type of
mount, which should become more general. The second method con-
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sists in providing an engine room on the airpl~ane,where the
“ms.c-hanican remain’ &nd from which he can have”access to the prin-
cipal organs of the engine groups. This room is particularly
I
easy to provide when the engines are arranged in tande-mwith
sufficient space between them for the engine room.
The question of dividing the power remains to be considered.
There has been much discussion on the advantages and disadvant-
ages of multi-engine airplanes and on the number of independent
1
groups which it is best to adopt. The first idea to present it-
self is that an injury to an engine group will be less dangero-
us in proportion to the s-mallnessof the fraction of the total
power represented by the group. The most favorable case, from
this viewpoint, is the one in which horizo.ltal flight ‘can be
maintained with one engine stopped. If horizontal flight,un-
der these conditions, is possible only by lightening the air-
plane of a portion of the fuel, arrangeinents should be made to
effect this as instantaneously as possible, so as to reduce the
loss in altitude corresponding to the intervening time.’ If the
loss in power is too great for the flight to remain horizontal,
the airplane can still utilize the remaining power to prolong
.
its flight and thus have a larger region in which to select a
,ltiding place, thus greatly increasing the..cha,nces,.ofa safe
landing.
It remains to consider whether increasing the number of en-
giaes does not also increase the chances of engine trouble in a
, ,,,, ,.
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proportion, to offset, or more
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than offset, the abovementioned
- advantages. The statistics, analyzed above,
centage ascribable to the ep.gine accessories
The failures from these causes are naturally
show the high per-
and to the piping.
increased by in-
creasing
ries are
there is
the number of the engines. If the pipes and accesso-
arranged so as to serve several independe-ntgroups,
danger that any injury to the common parts may simultan-
eously paralyze all the available power and thus eliminate the
very advantages it is desired to obtain. On the other hand,
the division of the power does mot diminish the fire hazards,
but rather increases them, because it increases the number of
the tanks and fuel pipes and scatters them more widely, and be-
cause it increases the number of carburetczs and the consequent
possibilities of backfiring. Lastly, it makes more work for
the pilot, when his airplane is in difficulty, to maneuver four
or five engines simultanf.cusly and to stop them all in time,
when necessitated by a forced landing or the breaking out of a
fire.
The conclusions drawn from these opposing arguments are
that the multi-engine airplanes afford incontestable guaranties
against stalls and forced landings, but that these advantages
are offset by risks of another nature,,which have to be combat-
ted in their turn. Among-the principal precautions which enable
this, are the following:
To limit the division of the power to three groups at the
N.A.C.A. Technical Memorandum No. 465 16
most. As long as the state of the cartdoes not enable a more
,...,. .
complete decentralization of the engine control-and-the transfer
of an important part of it to the mechanic, there is dang&r that
a larger number of engines would make it impossible for the pilot
to watch them during flight and would overburden him in making
the necessary maneuvers.
To obtain, on the contrary, the complete independence of
each g~oup and of all its accessories, including tanks, with
respect to the other groups.
To arrange the controls in as clear a manner and as well
grouped as possible. To provide a single maneuver to stop all
the engines simultaneously in case of acciflent.
To give special attention to the arrangement of the fuel
tanks and pipes. Oversights, which would “oeof no great conse-
quence on single-engine airplanes, become dangerous on multi-
engined airplanes, through the develop~fientand dispersion of these
accessories.
To take all possible precautions against fire.
It was probably due to the neglect of all or of some of
these precautions that several large multi-engine airplames
had serious accidents in 1926.
.,.,
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Precautions against Fire
.>. .,..
We have just seen the increasing importance which the use
of multi-engine airplanes gives to precautions against fire. The8
instantaneous violence of the fire, the frequent inadequacy of
the means for fighting it and its destructiveness contribute to
make the danger of fire one of the chief obstacles to the de–
veloprnent of aviation. Fire may break out either during flight
or on the ground. In the latter case, it may occur either during
take-offs or normal landings or after a lanclin,gaccident. Fires
on “the ground, during normal maneuvers, are more frequent than
is generally supposed. In 1925-1926 there were two or three
such fires a month, all due to back-firing to the carburetor.
Damages resulted, however, from only 10$ of the cases. The fire
was almost always overcome by extinguishers, kept on board Or
on the field. Fires on the ground or during ordinary maneuvers
are of no special inte~”e~i!to consider here, excepting so far
as they furnish information concerning the causes of the fire
and the means of fighting it. Such fires should be completely
eliminated byl@ating the.openings of the air intake pipes clear-
Iy outside the cowling and by keeping the engine compart~ents
free from deposits of fuel and oil.
,B4m . . ,, ,k.. ,.,... ... ,,
,.
The analysis”of fifteen
during flight, show:
3 due to back-firing,
recent fires-in-military aviation,
4 n “ leaks or breaks in the pipes,
18N.A.C.A. Technical Memorandum No. 465
3 due to injuries to the engine parts,
5 1’ f’ unknown causes.
,,.,. -., ..
The causes of ten recent fires in civil aviation, during flight,
were:
~ failures of engine parts,
1 break in pipe,
2 not determined.
In military aviation there are
firing without previous injury
These cases are similar to the
relatively wore cases due to back-
to engine than In civil aviation.
abovementioned fires on the ground
and should be eliminated by the precautions indicated for the
latter.
Except the back-firing, the causes in the above two catego-
ries are the same, although in different proportions, namely, in-
juries to the engine parts and leakage of the pipes. The large
proportion of injuries to the engines, in civil aviation, is
explained by the fact that t’hecivil cases of fire extend over
{J’
#i? sev’eralyears,
~1
while the military cases cover a much shorter
~
i
?! period. The above 25 fires during flight caused the destruction”
,.>!.
.$‘I of 18 airplanes (72%) and four deaths (16%)0
‘!’
‘~ For the same periods, the statistics show 27 fires on the
~~ ground after landing accidents. These 27 cases caused the de-
*
,. “.. ..-. ., -,. .,.. -
1$1 “st~fictidri”’’o’f26 of’’the’27 airplanes with 14 deaths “(54%). It is
obvious that, although the ground fires after accidents are hard-
ly more frequent than fires during flight, they are much more
[
.,,
‘1
fi— .—
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serious both for the personnel and for the materiel. The causes
.
of these 27 cases were as follows:
Capsizing and landing on the nose . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Stalls, etc., generally preceded by injuryto engine . 16
.,
Collision with an obstacle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Niiscellaneous . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . l 4
Capsizings and collisions caused nearly a fourth of”the most
serious fires. We have already seen they can “Deavoided (better
education of the pilots, maneuverability of the airplanes and
better airports), so that it is not necessary to revert to them
here. Every measure increasing the reliability ‘ofthe engines
and their accessories will reduce the number and gravity of the
fires, since forced landings are almost aiways caused by injuries
to these organs.
But, however efficacious such measures may be, they can
only reduce the frequency of engine tzoubles, l~ithout entirelY
eliminating them. The investigation of precautions to be taken
against fire is therefore i~lorenecessary than ever. It is suf-
,,
1: ficient, moreover, to limit the investigation to the case of a
:;
,. forced landing after an injury to the engine, not only because
:t,1*
t this is the most dangerous case, but because it is the most dif-
i
~
1
--fioultone to combat, by .reason,,oft-hedislocations entailed in
.1
jj the gasoline or electric conduits, in the fuel tanks and through-
~,)
out the whole airplane.
It is in this connection t“hata remarkable series of experi-
ments has been undertaken in the United States during the past
N.A.C.A. Technical Memorandum lTo.465 20
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few years. Old airplanes, wit’h their engines running, have been
launched on an inclined plane, at the end of which there was a
wall against w~ich the airplanes crashed. Thanks to this device
and to the numerous ‘motionpictu-res* taken during the test’s,it
has been possible to observe the development of many fires. The
principal conclusions, deduced from these’ experiifientsby the
American authorities, are as follo~~s:
‘fThetanks should be capable of being cast off. They should
be separated from the engine by a fire wall. In so far as avoid-
able the tanks should not be placed directly behind and above the
engine, so as not to incur the risk of their being broken by the
force of the landing shock and spilling their contents on the
hot parts of the engine.
‘fThree-fourths of the fires, after the crash, are attributa–
ble to the heating of the exhaust pipes, and the fire hazard is
greater in proportion to the ‘length of these pipes. It is ad-
visable therefore, to test with care every new exhaust device;
in particular to run the engine at reduced iwtake ~d slight
advance, so as to heat the exhaust pipe to the i’naxigum;to ~lake
several injections of gasoline and of oil into the proper pipes
and to make sure that no combustion results. , .
‘fLastly,great precautions must be taken for isolating the
,.
ignition conduits and t-negasoline and oil pipes. The’attach-
~These pictures, obligingly lent by the military attache of.the “-
United States in France, were shown, at the beginning,of 1927,
to the Soci6te’.-deNavigation ,Ac?riennejltand to thetfService Tech-
nique de lfA6rona.utique.lr
I
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ments of the latter must be disposed in such a“manner that, in
case...=f.shoc,k,,,a..aslight displacement of the pipe with respect to
the cowling shall be possible, without break or leak. In every
way, the gasoline and oil should be prevented from coming in
contact with the electric wires or with the hot parts of the
engine.tl
‘ind most of the precautions actu-In these conclusions, we .
ally required in Fzance. The”test with the exhaust pipe, ~n~hich
which is not customary in France, would be worth trying, t’nough
it may be questioned as to whether the conclusion relative to
the prepoilderant role played “bythe exhaust in ground fires, is
generally applicable, or ~~~r~etherit is not rather due to the
.
particular conditions of the American experiments.
‘ In these experiments, the airplane crashed against a wall,
after a run at low speed- The exhaust pipe was therefore poor- .
ly cooled. On the other hand, the ignition reinainedon, while
the propeller stopped immediately on striking the wall. On the
contrary, in the case of an ordinary fall, the pilot generallY
has ‘time to switch off the ignition, and the propeller makes a
few more revolutions before stopping. The exhaust gases are thus
expelled into the atmosphere and the hot portions of the valves
and pipes may cool so as to be no longez incandescent. In the
.,- . . ...
American experiments, there was no time for the gases to be ex-
pelled, the incandescent parts remained so and, when the gaso-’
line left the tanks, it was’vaporized in the atmosphere, came in
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contact with the incandescent parts and ignited in a body. The
pictures of the experiments show this pheilomenonvery clearly.
,.=,,
Lastly, the airplanes tested had only single exhaust pipes of
various lengths, without mu.ffl~rs or spark screens. The use of
these devices, properly installed, would reduce the fire hazard,
even on the ground. At any rate, there are plenty of fires, “ooth
in flight and on the ground, O? aiiplanes without exhaust pipes,
to demonstrate the need of seeking other remedies than the im-
provement or removal of these accessories.
For the gasoline to ignite and prodtice a ,general conflagr~
tion, there must be a combination of two ,circumstancesj n~ilely,
an injury or leak of some pipe or accessory, scattering the gas-
oline outside’,where it vaporizes, ami the ignition of the car-
bureted air by contact with a spark or with a red-hot part of
the engine.
In the case of back-tiring, the explosive mixture is not due
to a fuel leak, but consists of the carbureted air contained in
the cylinders and intake “pipes. Due to some defect in tliefuel
system or in the functioning of the engine, this mixture comes
in contact with the spark from a spark plug while the intake
valves are still open. The flames thus produced are propagated
to the carburetor aildthence to the air intakes and the rest
the-”ai2pl~es.
..
The analysis of these phenomena indicates the following
of
rem-
edieso- The carburetor air7int@e pipes should ex’tendfar enough
%.
,
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outside the fuselage, so that t+~eflames produced by back-firing
cannot come in contact with any combustible substance. It is.
,. ,.-,.... .,... .,
generally much better for the air-intake pipes to open at the
side of, rather than underneath the engine, so that any gasoline,
leaking from the pipes,
back-fire. Lastly, the
to reduce the frequency
selves.
cannot encounter the hot gases of the
use of special.valves or devices can help
or the violence of t-heback-fires thein-
Although it isrelatively easy to prevent fuel leaks in nor-
mal flight, it is much more difficult to avoid them in case of
serious injury to the engiileor in case of a hard landing. Leaks,
without ruptures, especiall~y at the joints or connections, are
then almost inevitable. They can be reduced by several precau-
tions, including the following ones: Dimension the attachments
of the pipes to the fuselage so that the attacluiflentswill always
break before the pipes themselves; make the attachments suffici-
ently flexible, so that the pipes held by them can shift or bend
appreciably before any break occurs; use copper tubing, rather
than duralqmin, because the former metal is more flexible and
less brittle than the latter.
Above all, it is important to prevent any escaping gasoline
from coming in contact with hot parts of the engine. Tlieengine
,,. ,.
and’’’it”sprincipal accessories should therefore be separated from
all fuel and oil tanks of any considerable capacity. This wall
must be impervious to gasoline and to the flames. It must not
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only be complete transversely, but it should be extended along
each, side o,f,$he fuselage far e-nough.so the flames issuing from
.,.,...-,-
the engine cannot get around it and carry the fire to the rest of
the airplane. Of course, the fuel and oil pipes must be prdvided
with quick-action stopcocks outside the fire wall.
If all airplanes had fire walls satisfying the above condi-
tions, probably most of the fires during flight would be prevented
and ground fires after hard landings would be less numerous.
There are two cases, however, where the efficacy of this de~-ice
will remain.uncertain. The first case is when the engine, driven
violently backward in landing, ram the fire wall and shatters
it more or less completely. The other case is when the fuel
tanks are too near the fire wall and are i~otfastened securely
enough to the fuselage: The attachments then
airplane lands on its nose, and the tanks are
fire wall and burst, spilling their contents.
give vvajT, when the
hurled against the
In order to combat
this double danger, the fire wall must be imadeas strong as pos-
sible,’ so that it will re-main intact, even under a violent shock.
This method is limited, however, by the question of weight. The
safety may be increased by leaving a distance of 15-20 cm (6-8 in.)
,,
between the fire wall and the .re,&rend of the engine, on the one
hand, and
,..,,
hand. At
withstand
between the same wall and the fuel talcs, cm the other
,,, . ...- ..
any rate, the tank attachments should be calculated to
the longitudinal stresses of inertia produced by land-
ing on the nose. Lastly, al~hough the presence of the fire wall
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is a great safeguard, it is preferable for the fuel tanks to be
placed outside the axis of the engin,e, so they will not be direct-%- .,-–-,, ,,,....--,,,.
lY exposed to being rmed by the latter, in the case of telescop-
:,
lng.
. . Other precautions to be taken are as follows: thorough venti-
lation of all places where gasoline vapors can accumulate; di-
rect drainage, to the outside of the airplane, of all drippings
of fuel and oil; adoption of special devices to prevent the fuel
from spilling out through the orifices for the admission of air,
in the event of a sudden motion of the airplane; use of protect-
ing flanges for the iba-itiomwires, which, coupled ~~iththe above-
mentioned precautions for the protection of the electric conduc-
tors, will prevent short-circuiting and sparks.
We have just enumerated the precautions
must be supplemented by means for combatting
have started. These means are of two kinds,
against fire. These
fires after they
one of which cor.-
sists iilgetting rid of the fuel as quickly as possible, so it
cannot feed the fire. The other consists in using fixe extin-
guishers.
Dropping the fuel tanks ,meets the first of these require-
ments. This is often done on military airplanes where, in addi-
tionto the”ordinary fire hazards, there is the danger from the
... ., ....,.,,,.,...
incendiary bullets used by the enemy. It remains to be seen
whether commercial airplanes, in time,sof peace? will be alwaYs
allowed, evbn in case of immediate danger, to release several
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hundred kilograms of inflammable liquid wherever they may happen
to be...Aside from this disadvantage, -it .isnot always possible
to install, under good conditions, ttiks which can be dropped.
It has been proposed to substitute for them a device for the
rapid emptying of the tankse Experience has shown, however, that
the shower of gasoline (which is very difficult to direct outside
the zone of danger for the airplane) incurs serious risks. V$e
cd therefore only indicate the dropping of the tanks as being
very desirable, without vlaking it mandatory. It may, for exam-
ple, be assumed that if the tanks are far enough from the engines
to make the flames traverse a large portion of the airplane be-
fore reaching them, it is of no real importance to drop them
during flight.
As to fire extinguishers on board, their efficacy cannot be
doubted. French statistics show that, two times in three, their
use extinguishes the fire or greatly retards its progress. Every
airplane should have at least or~efixed extinguisher installed in
the engine group. On large airplanes this should be supplement-
ed by one or more portable extinguishers. Moreover, the fixed
extinguisher should be provided with an automatic fire alarm for
warning the pilot, as soon as the temperature near the engine
co-roesabnormal, so that the fire c&nnot be smoldering without’his
,,’.,...,...’,.’ ,..,,
.,.,,,.
knowledge, only to burst forth later with a violence impossible
to overcome.
An alarm which allows the pilot to decide when to use the
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extinguisher, is preferable to an automatic extinguisher, which
is often heavy and.complicated and which is liable to function
at the wrong tiifle. In any case, the pilot should be able to
stop the extinguisher as soon as he thinks best. He may need
to do so, because the emitted vapors become dangerous, or in or-
der to reserve some of the liqdid for use in the event of a-
other fire. Since the extinguisher attacks the effect without
always destroying the original cause, it is not surprising that
the fire, after being extinguished, starts again ’of itself. In
such an event the pilot is left without protection, if his re-
serve of liquid has been imprudently exhausted.
It may he remarked that the action of the cxtinbqisher is
more effective in an inclosed space. Fro:flthis point of view,
well-cowled engines arc safer than ei~gines left uncovered for
observatio-n or cooliil~. Lastly, extinguishers have been much
criticised for the relati’retoxicity of’the substances vmed.
This can be restricted, however, by certain precautions and is
more than offset by the increase in safety.
Thus far we have assumed that the engines wore supplied
with ordinary fuel. It is obvious that the safety would be con-
siderably increa~ed by the use of a less volatile. fuel. Many
researches have been undertaken in different countries, either
,,,.,,. .. .. . . . .
in the hope of inventing new aviation engines capable of burning
existing heavy fuels, or of inventing new fuels capable of being
~used in existing engines. These researches ha,venot yet met
.
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with industrial success. Engine s,.of the Diesel or other types,
capable of using heavy fuels, now have too great a weight Per
,,.
horsepower for their use in aviation to be anticipated very soon.
It is hoped, however, that further progress will eventually ren-
der it possible.
As to so-called Ilsafetyllaviation fuels (Durnanois,X), great
hopes have been based on therfl. Inventors and scientists have
proposed several, whose first tests were encouraging. It is of-
ten far, however, from the preparation of a few liters of a new
liquid in the laboratory to the industrial production of a stable
homogeneous fuel of uniform quality. Assuming that these diffi-
culties will be overcome and th,a’~the product will be comparable
with gasoline, as to power, price and quality of conservation,
its use will necessitate a reinvestigation of all the factors
of the problem of carbu~ctior.. It is only necessary to recall
the long researches requi:ed for perfecting the carburetors now
used for aviation gasoline, in order to comprehend the new dif-
.
ficulties presented. These difficulties should not discoura~e
investigators, however, though it is well to recognize and take
account of them in the interest of further improvements it is
hoped to iuake.
Accessory Installations Affecting Safety
,.,. . ,-,.’,.
We have just reviewed the accidents attributable to the pi-
lots, to the cells and to the engines. These accidents are about
80~ of the total number. The remaining 20% include a certain
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number of cases whose causes were not definitely
which, if better known, would doubtless increase
>- –.-,. .—= -, ,, ,- ... .,
portion. There still remain, however, about 10%
whose causes are different and must be fought by
the ones we have just been considering.
determined and
the above pro-
of the accidents,
other means than
A better knowledge
rate forecasting of the
to inclemencies. These
of imeteorologyand a more rapid and accu-
.
weather will diminish the accidents due
improvements are all the ‘moreurgent be-
cause nonstop flights are increasing in frequency and length and
,
cover regions whose atmospheric conditions are more varied.
Among the inclemencies, there are few
than fog or even low cloud-s. This is
special instruments, flight in fog or
more feared by aviators
because, despite the use of
clouds is difficult and the
landing dangerous. Low clouds, moreover, tempt pilots to flY
close to the ground and too near to obstacles. A good sounder,
enabling the aviators to measure with precision the distance be-
tween the airplane smi the ground rendered invisible by fog,
would be of great service.*
The radio, by rendering it possible to keep continually in
touch with the ground and to call for help in case of need, is
an indispensable instrument for long voyages. Lastly, the vari-
ous processes of radiogoniometry, tall beacons and signaling de-
.
$$ vices “all ‘contribute to the ‘common”ca-use”by reducing-the errors
\
~ of navigation and easing the task of the pilot. Unfortunately,
~
many of these methods require, on tb.epart of those who use them,
—-
i *A contest for”such s~~nders, endoue’Qwith large prizes, has been{; recently inaugurated by the 1’Comit6‘de Propagand.e pour ltA6ronau-
‘1
.tique.’]
IL —
. “,.,
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a technical knowledge which is relatively rare and which there-
C.=. fore..limits their possi-bilities.
It renains to consider the question of parachutes (Mazer,
,. xv). These have saved life too often for their efficacy to be
denied. They should be obligatory on all airplanes whose occu--
pants know how to’make use of them. It is desirable, moreovez,
for the parachutes to have a double releasing device, i.e., so
they can be opened at will by a motiom of”the passenger or by
.,
means of a cord attached to the fuselage. The only reservation
that can be made concerns their adoption. on public passenger
airplanes. The passengers on these airplanes are many and they
are inclosed in the fuselages from which they cannot escape
quickly. They are ignorant of the necessary precautions for the
parachute and the harness, both in launching and in landing.
Under these conditions, it is to be feared that an order giver.
* the passengers by the pilot to jump overboard with their para-
chutes would only create a panic and would cause accidents at
least as serious as the ones it is desired to avoid. Cormflercial
aviation companies do not provide parachutes for the passengers
..
i
‘k
and it can hardly be required of them to do so at present. Per-
!} haps this problem will sodetime be solved by the use of adetach-
!‘1
\:~ able cabin provided with a parachute similar to the basket ‘para-
p .,. . . . ,.’, ,, .,.--!.,----.!,-,
1pi chutes for captive balloons, but nothing practical has yet been
i’ invented in this line.
{1
. ——
I
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Conclusions and Summary
We have considered in rapid review the
relating to the safety of aerial navigation
varied, numerous and complex these problems
is facilitated, however, by the endeavor to
31
principal problems
and have seen how
are. Their solution
understand them bet-
ter. For each particular problem, we have indicated its present
status and the direction in which researches should be made.
The following points seem to ~e the ones most in need of serious
attention:
Raising the standards for the education of pilots; crea-
tion of a special school of aerial navigation;
Improvement of the inaneuverability of airplanes at very
low speeds;
Increasing the speed range;
Methodical use of instruments to avoid stalls; warning de-
vices;
Methodical investigation of flight stability for various
loads and engine speeds; flight without using the controls;
Extension of th-edual control; increasing the comfort of the
\
pilots! posts;
~ Experimental measurements of the stresses sustained in
,,
flight by the various airplane parts, especially by the ailerons;
&
.
F
! Methodical improvement of the conditions of functioning andf,
i~
! of installation of the engine accessories;
. . . . .. .-.
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Stronger, more flexible and better installed pipes and con-
.. sections; - . --
. General adoption of removable engine beds;
Improvement of multi-engine installations;
Development and strengthening of the fire walls;
Thorough investigation of the best relative positions to
give the fuel tanks and engi~es, with the necessary precautions
to be observed in each case;
Met’hodicaJ.development of fire extinguishers and alarms;
Research on the use of safety fuels.
Frorilnow on, these problems”will be the objects of inten-
sive research in most countries. All technicians know that the
future of aviation’depends on their gradual solution.
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